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Abstract—In this paper, we show that different types of
evolutionary game dynamics are, in principle, special cases of
a dynamical system model based on our previously reported
framework of generalized growth transforms. The framework
shows that different dynamics arise as a result of minimizing a
population energy such that the population as a whole evolves
to reach the most stable state. By introducing a population
dependent time-constant in the generalized growth transform
model, the proposed framework can be used to explain a vast
repertoire of evolutionary dynamics, including some novel forms
of game dynamics with non-linear payoffs.
Index Terms—Dynamical systems, evolutionary game theory,
growth transforms, Baum-Eagon inequality, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
EVOLUTIONARY games utilize classical game theoreticconcepts to describe how a given population evolves over
time as a result of interactions between the members of the
population. The fitness of an individual in the population is
governed by the nature of these interactions, and in accordance
with the Darwinian tenets of evolution [1], [2]. For instance,
in a strategic game each individual receives a payoff or gain
according to the survival strategy it employs, as a result of
which the traits or strategies with the maximum payoffs even-
tually dominate the population through reproduction, mutation,
selection or cultural imitation. These principles of evolutionary
game dynamics have been applied to different applications
ranging from genetics, social networks, neuroeconomics to
congestion control and wireless communications [2]–[13].
In literature, numerous mathematical models have been
proposed to describe the evolutionary process [2], [14]–[17]
and are briefly summarized in Figure 1. Each of these models
subsumes different set of assumptions on the types of strategies
and payoffs that the population employs in the course of
evolution. However, all of these formulations can be math-
ematically expressed as a dynamical system model which for
stable games eventually converges to a stationary point on
the probability simplex defined by the available strategies in
the population. The dynamics are inherently nonlinear in the
most generic case, and the existence of Nash equilibria(NE) or
of Evolutionarily Stable States(ESSs) depends on the nature
of the inter-species interactions [2], [18], [19]. In this paper,
we report that many of these evolutionary game models
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Figure 1. Illustration of the scope of the paper: Most of the commonly known
evolutionary stable game dynamics can be obtained from the generalized
growth transform dynamical system model, by using different forms of cost
functions, adaptive time constants and manifolds.
are special cases of our previously reported framework of
a growth transform based dynamical system model [20], as
illustrated in Figure 1. The framework was derived from
an energy minimization-based perspective that exploited the
inherent tendency of all natural systems to evolve to their
most stable state (which is also the state where the system
has the minimum free energy) subject to different conservation
constraints [21], [22]. In this paper, we can extend the same
argument to a population/network where individuals interact
with each other to reach the population level most stable
configuration in an energy landscape. The approach is thus
similar in flavor to the concept of congestion games, and
more generally potential games, which map the Nash equilibria
of a game to the locally optimal points of a corresponding
Lyapunov or potential function. For stable potential games in-
volving strictly concave potentials, a unique Nash equilibrium
always exists [16], [23]–[25]. Section II gives an overview
of the generalized growth transform dynamical system model.
In this paper, we demonstrate how most of the commonly
studied evolutionary dynamics are special cases of the growth
transform based dynamical system model. Growth transforms
have been applied previously for solving replicator equations
with linear payoffs and in discrete-time scenarios [14], [26]–
[28]. In Section III we demonstrate how different types of
known evolutionary dynamics like replicator dynamics with
nonlinear payoffs, imitation games, best response dynamics,
Brown-von-Neumann dynamics etc. can all be derived from
the generic growth transform dynamical system model, in
addition to generation of several interesting types of hitherto
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II. MAIN RESULT
In [20], we used the Baum-Eagon inequality [29] to show
that an optimal point of a generic Lipschitz continuous cost
function H(p),p ∈ D ⊂ RN , where D = {p ∈ R+N :
pi ≥ 0,
N∑
i=1
pi = 1}, corresponds to the steady state solution
of the generalized growth transform dynamical system model
with time-constant τ > 0, given by
τ p˙i + pi =
pi
[
− ∂H(p)
∂pi
+ λ
]
∑
i
pi
[
− ∂H(p)
∂pi
+ λ
] , (1)
The above equation can be rewritten in a compact form as
follows
τ p˙i = pi
[
fi(p)
f¯
− 1
]
, (2)
where fi(p) =
[
− ∂H(p)
∂pi
+ λ
]
∀i and f¯ = ∑i pifi(p).
The constant λ ∈ R+ is chosen to ensure that fi(p) > 0,∀i.
However, the convergence of Equation (1) to the steady-
state solution also holds if the time-constant τ is also varied
with time. This is because the normalization constraint is the
only condition on the population state at any instant of time so
as to ensure that the manifold D is an invariant manifold, and
hence other types of time constants can also be used, provided
it is identical for all the strategies. If different strategies evolve
according to different time constants, however, convergence
to a locally optimal solution for Lipschitz continuous cost
functions is not guaranteed. In this paper we will vary τ as
a function of p such that τ =
1
g¯(p)
, where g¯(p) > 0 could
be an arbitrary time-varying function. Substituting for τ in
Equation (2) we arrive at the key dynamical system model
equation:
p˙i = pi
[
fi(p)
f¯
g¯(p)− g¯(p)
]
. (3)
We will now show that Equation (3) can be used to explain
different evolutionary game dynamics reported in literature and
also for proposing some new forms of dynamics.
III. EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS
We first introduce some mathematical notations and ter-
minology pertaining to evolutionary dynamics arising in the
context of deterministic games [2], [3], [14]. In deterministic
games, the Nash equilibrium (if it exists), remains unchanged
even when perturbed by a small percentage of mutants or
external agents playing a different strategy. Also, we will only
consider stable games that converge to a global and stable
Nash equilibrium [16], [25].
Consider an infinitely large population with a finite set
S = {1, . . . , N} of N pure strategies available to each
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Figure 2. Illustration of a symmetric game setup with four pure strategies:
(a)Population at any instant of time (colors denote the strategy each individual
adopts at any time t); (b)Histogram showing the relative abundance of the
strategies in the population, p1− p4; (c)Linear payoff case, where the payoff
of an individual with strategy i playing against another with startegy j is
given by aij , with the fitness of i being
∑
j
aijpj ; (d)Nonlinear payoff case,
where each strategy i has a fitness fi(p) against the population Q.
individual of the population. The ith strategy is then quantified
using a relative abundance measure pi ∈ R+ and a fitness
function (or expected payoff) fi(p) (fi : RN+ 7→ R+), where
p ∈ D is the set with elements pi. It should be noted here
that though the fitness is a function of the relative abundances
of various strategies adopted by the population in the most
generic case, constant fitness scenarios are also possible in
certain types of evolutionary games. Also, for most of the
dynamics discussed in this paper, we will consider symmetric
games, where all individuals have the same strategy set S
during the course of evolution. Figure 2(a) shows an example
of a symmetric game comprising of four pure strategies, where
each color denotes the strategy that each individual in the
population Q adopts at any instant of time. Figure 2(b) shows
the relative abundance pi for each strategy in the population
and Figure 2(c) shows an example of a linear payoff function.
In this case, each individual which plays a strategy i against
any random member of the population playing a strategy j
receives a constant payoff aij . The average payoff or fitness
of the i−th strategy is then given by ∑
j
aijpj . Figure 2(d)
illustrates a more general payoff scenario, where the average
payoff corresponding to the i − th strategy could be a non-
linear function fi(p).
Next, we present some of the most common types of
evolutionary game dynamics existing in literature, and their
relation to the growth transform dynamical system model
proposed in Equation (3) by choosing the function g¯(p) to
be directly proportional to the instantaneous mean payoff of
the population, and using different forms of the cost function
H .
3A. Replicator dynamics
Replicator dynamics [30] model the case where evolution
occurs by pure natural selection, and the fitness of the indi-
vidual is governed by the frequencies of other strategies in the
population. The population thus evolves in a way as to promote
strategies having payoffs higher than the mean payoff at any
instance of time. The generic form of replicator dynamics with
a nonlinear fitness function is given by:
p˙i = pi[fi(p)− f¯ ], f¯ =
∑
i
pifi(p) (4)
The replicator dynamics can be derived from the growth
transform dynamical system model by considering g¯(p) =∑
i
pi(fi(p)+λ) and a network level cost function of the form
H(p) = −
∑
i
∫ pi
c
fi(z)dzi − λ
∑
i
pi, (5)
where fi(p) is a smooth monotonic function of pi, and
λ > 0 is chosen so as to ensure fi(p) > 0, and can
be thought of as a constant background payoff. Note that
fi(z) = fi(p1, . . . , zi, . . . , pn) ∀i, where zi is a dummy
variable corresponding to the i−th strategy.
Of particular interest are the replicator dynamics under a
linear payoff scenario with a constant payoff matrix A in a
symmetric game (aij being the fitness of strategy i against any
other strategy j) and (Api) being the fitness or average payoff
of strategy Si. This can be derived from the growth transform
dynamical system model by using g¯(p) =
∑
i pi((Ap)i + λ)
and a cost function of the form H(p) = −pTAp − λ∑
i
pi
over the probabilistic domain D. The corresponding dynamics
are given by:
p˙i = pi[(Ap)i − pTAp] (6)
In [26], [31], the discrete-time version of Equation (6) given
by
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)
Ap(t)i + λ∑
i
pi(t)(Ap(t)i + λ)
, (7)
where λ is a constant baseline payoff, was shown to be a
special case of the Baum-Eagon inequality, and was employed
for solving maximum clique and graph isomorphism problems
which are commonly encountered in computer vision [26]–
[28], [32].
The Lotka-Volterra equation can also be derived from the
linear payoff form of the replicator equation by means of a
simple linear transformation.
B. Quasispecies evolution
These dynamics correspond to a constant fitness landscape
[33], where replications from one generation to the next are
error-prone with a high enough mutation rate, i.e., the j−th
strategy can mutate to the i−th strategy with a probability
mji. Forward and backward mutations are equally probable
in this model, i.e., the mutation matrix M = {mij} is a
doubly stochastic symmetric matrix, with mij = mji, and
∑
i
mij =
∑
j
mij = 1. The dynamical system corresponding
to this model of evolution is as follows :
p˙i =
∑
j
pjfjmji − pi
∑
i
pifi,
∑
i
mji = 1 ∀i (8)
Noting that the mutation matrix M is doubly stochastic
and that each strategy has a constant fitness, the quasispecies
dynamics can be achieved by using g¯(p) =
∑
i
pi[fi + λ] and
a cost function of the form
H(p) = −
∑
i
log(pi)
∑
j
pjfjmji − λ
∑
i
pi, (9)
since
∑
i
mji = 1.
C. Replicator-mutator dynamics
When both replication and mutation contribute to the evo-
lutionary process, we arrive at the replicator-mutator equation
[34]:
p˙i =
∑
j
pjfj(p)mji − pi
∑
i
pifi(p),
∑
i
mji = 1 ∀i
(10)
In a fashion similar to the previous two types of evolutionary
dynamics, the mathematical equation governing the replicator-
mutator model can be arrived at by considering and time
constant g¯(p) =
∑
i
pi[fi(p) + λ] and a cost function of the
form
H(p) = −
∑
i
∫ pi
c
∑
j
pjfj(z)mijdzi − λ
∑
i
pi. (11)
The above three examples belong to a more general class
of evolutionary dynamics called imitation games, which are
of the form p˙i = piζi(p), with
∑
i piζi(p) = 0 ∀p ∈ D.
D. Logit dynamics and best response dynamics
The logit dynamics [35] represent a class of evolutionary
games where the individuals have a partial knowledge about
the global state of the system, with a parameter η > 0
representing the noise level of the system. At each step, an
individual selects a strategy so as to select the current best
response, depending on the noisy population-level knowledge
that it possesses. The dynamics of this form are given by:
p˙i =
exp(fi(p)/η)∑
i
exp(fi(p)/η)
− pi (12)
For noiseless systems, i.e., when η → 0, this converges to the
best response dynamics [36], where each individual chooses
the best available strategy with the highest probability. A
discrete time version of the best response dynamics is the
fictitious play [37].
For arriving at the Logit dynamics from the growth trans-
form model, we choose g¯(p) =
∑
i
exp(fi(p)/η) a cost
function of the form:
H(p) = −
∑
i
∫ pi
c
1
zi
exp{fi(z/η)}dzi, pi > 0 ∀i, (13)
where fi(z) has the same definition as in the replicator
dynamics case.
4E. Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics
When each strategy gets updated only if its payoff is greater
that the average payoff of the population with a certain margin
, we obtain the following equation which corresponds to the
Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics [38]:
p˙i = ki(p)− pi
∑
i
ki(p) (14)
where ki(p) = max(0, ((Ap)i − pTAp+ )).
The BNN dynamics, similarly, can be achieved by consid-
ering g¯(p) =
∑
i
ki(exp(x)) and a cost function of the form:
H(p) = −
∑
i
∫ pi
c
1
zi
ki(z)dzi (15)
where ki(p) = max(0, ((Ap)i − pTAp+ )) as before, and
pi > 0 ∀i.
F. Unconventional and novel dynamics
Novel types of evolutionary dynamics can be arrived at by
using other forms of the function g¯(p), and also by using
other variants of the cost function. A particularly interesting
scenario uses a cost function H(p) = −∑
i
∫ pi
c
h(zi)fi(z)dzi,
which leads to a dynamical system of the form:
p˙i = pi
[
f ′i(p)
f¯ ′
g¯(p)− g¯(p)
]
, (16)
where f ′i(p) = h(pi)fi(p) = h(pi)
[
− ∂H
∂pi
+ λ
]
∀i.
We can choose a form of h(pi) ∀i such that only a certain
sub-population is selected to determine the mean fitness of the
entire population. Potential candidates for the form of the func-
tions h(·) include derivatives of smooth saturation functions
like the hyperbolic tangent function, the logistic function, the
sigmoidal function, the softmax function etc. For example, us-
ing h(pi) = sech2(pi) (which corresponds to the derivative of
the hyperbolic tangent function) in Equation (3) would lead to
f ′i(p) = sech
2(pi)fi(p), which updates only certain members
of the population instead of the entire population, as in the
case of the standard evolutionary games. Though such types
of optimization problems do not necessarily have a globally
optimal solution due to the non-convexity of the domain and/or
the objective function under consideration, convergence to a
locally optimal solution is always guaranteed in such cases.
Intuitively, this implies that even when each strategy in the
population gets updated with limited information about the
overall population behavior, the population will converge to a
locally stable solution eventually. The concept is thus similar
in essence to the lattice based population dynamics [39], [40]
approach, where each individual updates its strategy based
only on the strategies of a certain number of players in its
local neighborhood, which can be described by a graph or
by a lattice structure. Such neighborhood based models which
allow local interactions and dispersal and operate at relatively
smaller spatial scales were shown to promote coexistence
of strategies leading to biodiversity [41], since dominated
strategies in such scenarios can form isolated clusters or can
survive by moving over time to a spatially different location
in the lattice structure [2].
IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we used an energy minimization framework
based on the generalized growth transform dynamical system
model to explain different types of network dynamics for
stable evolutionary games having a unique strictly stable Nash
equilibrium. We also showed how unexplored evolutionary
processes can also be mapped to a growth transform dynamical
system with an adaptive time constant, using different variants
of the underlying cost function and domain of definition. In
this regard the optimal point of the objective function can be
related to the Nash equilibrium and the evoluationaly stable
state (ESS) of the evolutionary game.
A Nash equilibrium of a game corresponds to the set of
strategies adopted by a population such that any deviation from
it in the subsequent stages would not result in an increased
payoff against the current strategy. An ESS, on the other
hand, is a population state which is inherently stable in the
sense that it cannot be invaded by a small group of mutants
playing the same strategy. While an ESS is always a Nash
equilibrium, the converse is not necessarily true, and only
holds for strict Nash equilibria [2], [18]. In the context of
the growth transform based formulation, we can conclude the
following correspondence between the cost function H and
the nature of the equilibria:
• A generic Lipschitz continuous cost function over a
convex domain might have multiple local minima, which
correspond to the Nash equilibria of the game, and do
not necessarily imply evolutionary stability.
• A general convex cost function over a convex domain has
a set of Nash equilibria which are always stable for the
types of dynamics discussed in the paper, and globally
stable for BR and BNN dynamics in particular.
• A strictly convex objective function over a convex domain
has a unique strict Nash equilibrium which is also the
ESS, and is globally stable for all types of evolutionary
dynamics discussed in this paper.
• A strictly concave cost function over a convex domain
leads to a locally or globally repelling Nash equilibrium.
Future directions will involve extension of the proposed dy-
namical system framework for incorporate continuous strategy
spaces leading to adaptive dynamics, and scenarios involving
multiple types of equilibria.
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